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ARGUMENTS 
I. CONTRARY TO THE STATE'S ASSERTIONS, THE TRIAL 
COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY ALLOWING THE 
STATE TO ELICIT AND INTRODUCE EVIDENCE OF MS. 
REDDISH'S SIX OR SEVEN-YEAR-OLD DRUG 
CONVICTION. 
A. Prior Evidence 
The State argues that Ms. Reddish was not harmed by the 
admission of evidence of her conviction for drug possession 
because the facts of the conviction had already been admitted and 
because there was overwhelming evidence of her guilt. See Brief 
of Appellee, pp. 11-14. The record on appeal and applicable case 
law demonstrate otherwise. 
Contrary to the State's assertion, the record demonstrates 
that the previously admitted evidence, to which the State refers, 
dealt only with drug use and arrest and not with the drug 
conviction wrongfully elicited by the State on cross-examination 
(Cf. R. 209:104-06 and R. 210:210:12-17). The State elicited Ms. 
Reddish's prior drug conviction on cross-examination as follows: 
Defendant: He never even told me what I was being 
arrested for, actually. 
Prosecutor: Okay. 
Defendant: I found out in jail. 
Prosecutor: But you did tell the officer that you 
had a prior conviction for meth? Seven 
years -
Defendant: No, I did not. I never did. No. It's 
nothing I brag about. 
(R. 210:210:12-17). 
1 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The aforementioned exchange, during which the State elicited 
the drug conviction, demonstrates that the proffered evidence was 
probative of no other issue other than the criminal propensity or 
character of Ms. Reddish. See State v. Saunders, 1999 UT 59, if 15, 
992 P. 2d 951. Moreover, the trial court's ruling was woefully 
short of the analysis required under Utah Rule of Evidence 4 04(b). 
Prior to deciding whether evidence of other crimes, wrongs, 
and bad acts is admissible under Rule 404 (b) , "the trial court 
must determine (1) whether such evidence is being offered for a 
proper, noncharacter purpose under 404(b), (2) whether such 
evidence meets the requirements of rule 402, and (3) whether this 
evidence meets the requirements of rule 403." State v. Nelson-
Waggoner, 2000 UT 59, ill6, 6 P. 3d 1120 (citing State v. Decorso, 
1999 UT 57, i|21-22, 29, 993 P.2d 837); see also Decorso, 1999 UT 
57 at i|l8 (stating that the "admission of prior crimes evidence 
itself must be scrupulously examined by trial judges in the proper 
exercise of that discretion.") (citation omitted). 
In the instant case, the trial court circuitously ruled that 
the State's reference to the prior drug conviction of Ms. Reddish 
was admissible because it goes to the intent of Ms. Reddish to 
possess the controlled substances found in her car (R. 210:215-
16). Additionally, the trial court concluded that "the probative 
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value on the intent issue rises above the level of the prejudicial 
issue." (R. 210:215-16). 
The trial court failed to discuss or take any evidence 
concerning the surrounding circumstances or similarities between 
the prior drug conviction and the drug charges at issue in the 
instant case. As a result, there was no demonstration of a nexus 
between the prior drug conviction and the alleged charges of 
possession of controlled substances and drug paraphernalia. In 
addition, the prior drug conviction that occurred some six or 
seven years ago did not satisfy the requirements of Utah Rule of 
Evidence 402. 
The trial court erred by concluding that the evidence of Ms. 
Reddish's prior drug conviction met the requirements of Utah Rule 
of Evidence 403. In the course of so ruling, the trial court 
failed to consider the various matters set forth by the Utah 
Supreme Court in State v. Shickles, 760 P. 2d 291, 295-96 (Utah 
1995) (quoting E. Cleary, McCormick on Evidence § 190, at 565 (3d 
ed. 1984)). The trial court failed to consider the similarities, 
if any, between the crimes. Moreover, the trial court failed to 
consider the lack of proximity between the crimes or how the 
interval-of-time factor might affect the Rule 403 analysis. 
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B. Harmful Error 
The State's assertion concerning harmless error is also 
ineffectual in the instant case. According to Utah case law, 
harmless errors are "errors which, although properly preserved 
below and presented on appeal, are sufficiently inconsequential 
that [the appellate court] conclude[s] there is no reasonable 
likelihood that the error affected the outcome of the 
proceedings." See State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 120 (Utah 1989). 
In other words, "[f]or an error to require reversal, the 
likelihood of a different outcome must be sufficiently high to 
undermine confidence in the verdict." State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 
913, 920 (Utah 1987); see also State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 
240 (Utah 1992) . In light of the foregoing, the likelihood in the 
instant case of a different result is sufficiently high to 
undermine confidence in the verdict. 
II • THE TRIAL COURT, AS CONCEDED BY THE STATE, 
ERRED BY FAILING TO DETERMINE ON THE RECORD 
THE ACCURACY OF CONTESTED INFORMATION 
CONTAINED IN THE PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION 
REPORT. 
The State concedes that the trial court erred in failing to 
resolve the alleged inaccuracy in the Presentence Investigation 
Report. See Brief of Appellee, pp. 15-16. However, the State's 
argument that the sentence previously imposed by the trial court 
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should not be disturbed is contrary to both the underlying policy 
of Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 and principles of due process. At the 
very least, the trial court should be allowed to exercise its 
discretion to resentence Ms. Reddish after resolving the 
inaccuracy in the Presentence Investigation Report. Moreover, the 
State's argument is directly contradicted by the nature of the 
sentence ultimately imposed by the trial court.1 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, as well as that set forth in the 
previously filed Brief of Appellant, Ms. Reddish respectfully 
requests that this Court reverse her convictions and remand the 
*Based upon the conviction of Possession or Use of a Controlled 
Substance, a second-degree felony, the trial court sentenced Ms. 
Reddish "to an indeterminate term of not less than one year nor more 
than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison", which the trial court 
suspended (R. 162). See Sentence, Judgment, Commitment, R. 161-65, 
a true and correct copy of which is attached to the Brief of 
Appellant as Addendum C. The trial court then sentenced Defendant to 
a term of 180 days in the Davis County Jail (Id.). The trial court 
also imposed the following sentences: (1) for the conviction of 
Possession or Use of a Controlled Substance, a class A misdemeanor, 
the trial court sentenced Ms. Reddish to a term of 365 days in the 
Davis County Jail, which the trial court suspended; (2) for the 
conviction of Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a class B 
Misdemeanor, the trial court sentenced Ms. Reddish to a term of 180 
days in the Davis County Jail, which the trial court suspended; and 
(3) for the conviction of Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol / 
Drugs, a class B Misdemeanor, the trial court sentenced Ms. Reddish 
to a term of 180 days in the Davis County Jail, which the trial court 
also suspended (Id.). 
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case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with 
this Court's instructions as set forth in its opinion. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 24th day of August, 2006. 
;GGINS, P . C . 
LiWigcurfis 
ys ^ S ^ A p p e l l a n t 
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ADDENDA 
No Addendum is utilized pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 24(a) (11) . 
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